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Abstract-The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at the Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), was specifically designed to provide a high neutron flux test 
environment for conducting a variety of experiments.  This paper addresses the safety assurance 
process for two general types of experiments conducted in the ATR facility and how the safety 
analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more 
routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore, this type of experiment is addressed in 
more detail in the ATR safety basis. This allows the individual safety analysis for this type of 
experiment to be more standardized. The second type of experiment is defined in more general 
terms in the ATR safety basis and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, the 
individual safety analysis for the second type of experiment tends to be more unique and is 
tailored to each experiment.
I. INTRODUCTION 
I.A. Background 
The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at the 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL) is the world’s premiere test reactor 
for performing high neutron flux, large volume, 
irradiation test programs.  With a thermal power rating of 
250 MW, the ATR is the largest operating United States 
Department of Energy (DOE) reactor. The ATR base 
program, under the authority of the DOE Office of 
Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, assures that 
other programs using the ATR will have reliable 
facilities well into the future. The reactor and associated 
facilities are well maintained and upgraded continually, 
further assuring researchers that long term programs can 
be completed.  
The ATR is a light water, low temperature, and low 
pressure test reactor. Light water serves as both neutron 
moderator and primary coolant, and beryllium is used as 
a reflector. 
Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of the reactor 
showing typical pressure vessel penetration areas, 
available experiment handling hardware, etc. 
Additional information pertaining to the ATR (and 
associated experiments) is provided in a “Users 
Handbook for the Advanced Test Reactor.”1
I.B. Experiment Categories 
The ATR is designed to accommodate two general 
types of irradiation experiments. The predominant type is 
a pressurized water loop (PWL) experiment that 
circulates water, at typical pressurized water reactor 
pressures and temperatures, past specimens being 
irradiated in the reactor core.  Heat generated in the 
specimens is transferred to the circulating water, which 
in turn, transfers the heat in heat exchangers located in a 
shielded cubicle external to the reactor.  The standard 
PWL experiment utilizes an “in-pile tube” that extends 
from the reactor pressure vessel top head down through 
the bottom head, with the circulating water entering and 
exiting the in-pile tube at the bottom head.  A simplified 
schematic diagram of a PWL experiment is shown in 
Figure 2.  Larger diameter irradiation spaces have been 
installed for PWL experiments by utilizing a “cross arm” 
with a pressure vessel penetration through the side of the 
vessel near the top of an in-pile tube (such that 
circulation water enters and exits the ATR pressure 
vessel at two separate locations rather than the same 
location in the bottom head as is done in a standard in-
pile tube).  PWL experiments have been characterized 
over many years of experience and the ATR safety basis 
relies on a comprehensive set of analyses of these 
experiments. 
The other general type of experiment is a “capsule” 
experiment.  Capsule experiments exhibit greater design 
Figure 1. Advanced Test Reactor. 
Figure 2. PWL Experiment Schematic. 
variations than the PWL experiments and are distinct 
from PWL experiments primarily in that they rely on 
reactor primary coolant for heat dissipation.  By 
controlling the heat dissipation from capsule 
experiments, the experiment target material temperatures 
can range from approximately the inlet temperature of 
the reactor primary coolant (< 51.7ż C) up to 
temperatures, for example, on the order of 1100ż C. 
Capsule experiments may either be a “drop-in” type 
(encapsulated and isolated within the reactor pressure 
vessel as shown in Figure 3) or an “instrumented lead” 
type (with both instrumentation and gas line leads 
penetrating the reactor pressure vessel as in Figure 4).  
Instrumented lead capsule experiments, with variable gas 
mixtures flowing around the target materials, allow for 
on-line temperature control of target materials. 
A cross section of the ATR core, showing 
experiment irradiation locations, is shown in Figure 5.  
The ATR includes 40 fuel elements arranged in a 
serpentine shape.  This arrangement of the reactor fuel 
results in 9 neutron flux trap regions in a 3 x 3 array.  
Five (designated in Figure 5 as NW, N, W, SW, and SE) 
of the nine flux trap regions are currently used for PWL 
experiments.  The flux trap designated as NE is currently 
used for capsule experiments identified as MICE 
(Multiple Irradiation Capsule Experiment).  Figure 5 also 
shows the C, E, and S flux trap regions with 7 irradiation 
positions (1.58 cm diameter) in each region.  These 
regions are currently designed for capsule experiments.  
Other irradiation positions within the flux trap regions 
are designated as inboard and outboard “A” positions 
and “H” positions.  The temperature and void reactivity 
coefficients are negative in the ATR fuel and moderator 
but are generally positive in the flux trap regions.  Safety 
assurance reactivity issues, for example, can be quite 
different for experiments, depending on the locations of 
the experiments and experiment design details. 
The unique ATR control system includes 16 vertical 
control drums (outer shim control cylinders in Figure 5) 
that rotate neutron poison/reflector materials toward or 
Figure 3. Drop-in Capsule Experiment. 
Figure 4. Instrumented Lead Capsule Experiment. 
Figure 5. ATR Experiment Irradiation Locations. 
away from the reactor core. This system provides an 
essentially symmetrical neutron flux profile about the 
horizontal mid-plane of the core throughout each reactor 
operating cycle and over the duration of experiment 
programs requiring years of irradiation.  Other control
components in the core region include 22 neck shim 
rods, 2 regulating rods, and 6 safety rods.  Experiments 
are not to interfere with the normal operation of these 
control elements. 
Each ATR operating cycle is initiated using a 
combination of new and partially spent fuel elements.  
The specific location of the selected fuel elements, along 
with the control capabilities of the outer shim control 
cylinders and neck shim rods, makes it possible to 
operate the ATR at separate power levels in the different 
flux trap regions.  These different power levels, or power 
divisions, can result in significantly different nuclear 
environments for experiments, depending of course on 
the irradiation positions of the experiments. 
      
I.C. Experiment Safety Assurance Package 
The ATR has many capabilities and a wide variety 
of experiments are performed in it.  Therefore the safety 
analyses required to ensure safe operation of each 
experiment, as well as the reactor itself, can be complex.  
The analyses applicable to the safety of each experiment 
are summarized in a packet referred to as the 
“Experiment Safety Assurance Package” (ESAP). The 
ESAP addresses the reactor physics, thermal, hydraulic, 
stress, seismic, vibration, radiological, and all other 
analyses necessary to ensure the experiment can be 
irradiated safely in the ATR. The requirements for 
reactivity worth, chemistry compatibilities, pressure 
limitations, material issues, etc. are specified in the ATR 
Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) and the Safety 
Analysis Report (SAR) for the ATR. Each applicable 
requirement in these documents is addressed in the 
ESAP, and supporting documentation (i.e. analyses, 
evaluations, etc.) is referenced to demonstrate how the 
experiment complies with the requirement.  If necessary, 
mitigating features such as reactor power limitations, 
additional safety systems, double encapsulation design, 
etc. must be provided to reduce the consequences of any 
postulated accidents to acceptable levels and therefore 
ensure safe irradiation of the experiment in the ATR. The 
ESAP is prepared and then submitted for several levels 
of review and approval prior to the project being granted 
permission to insert the experiment in the reactor.  
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT SAFETY 
ASSURANCE PROCESS 
II.A. General Safety Analysis Considerations
The current ATR safety basis establishes the risk 
envelope for operating the reactor, including operation of 
the experiments within the reactor.  General safety 
analysis considerations must therefore include 
recognition that postulated reactor accidents can impact 
an experiment and conversely, postulated experiment 
accidents can impact the reactor.  Postulated experiment 
accidents must, whether or not they impact the reactor, 
exhibit consequences within the risk envelope for the 
reactor.  A proposed experiment that would be outside of 
the existing reactor risk envelope would require a change 
to the reactor safety basis.  A change to the reactor safety 
basis to expand the risk envelope would require review 
and approval by the DOE.  Not all conceivable 
experiments can be described in the reactor safety basis 
and therefore, as part of the experiment safety assurance 
process, each experiment is assessed relative to the risk 
envelope for the reactor per the Code of Federal 
Regulations 10 CFR 830 requirements for unreviewed 
safety questions (USQ). 10 CFR 830 requires application 
of the USQ process in situations where there is a “test or 
experiment not described in the existing documented 
safety analysis.”2
The current ATR safety basis has been developed to 
provide flexibility in being able to accommodate a 
variety of experiments.  Part of this flexibility has been 
achieved by defining several “Plant Protection Criteria” 
that must be satisfied during the irradiation of an 
experiment.  A fundamental function of the ESAP is to 
demonstrate compliance to the “Plant Protection 
Criteria.”
The “Plant Protection Criteria” limit direct 
radiological consequences and potential damage to plant 
barriers that prevent or mitigate radiological releases.  
They are divided into four categories (Condition 1, 2, 3, 
and 4) that address a range of conditions from normal 
operational events to extremely unlikely faulted 
conditions.  They are abbreviated, for illustrative 
purposes, as follows: 
x Condition 1 (Normal operation) – Radiation 
exposure limits of: 1.00 mSv/year effective dose 
equivalent (EDE) and 0.10 mSv/year EDE from 
airborne release to off-site public and 0.05 Sv/year 
total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to workers. 
Reactor fuel source term protection limit:  The 
integrity of the reactor fuel cladding is not 
challenged except for limited clad defects. 
x Condition 2 (Anticipated faults) – Radiation 
exposure limits of:  5 mSv/year TEDE to off-site 
public and 50 mSv/year TEDE to workers. Reactor 
fuel source term limit:  No rupture of the reactor fuel 
plate cladding is allowable unless the clad failure is 
the initiating fault.  For canal accidents no melting 
of the fuel plate cladding is allowed. 
x Condition 3 (Unlikely faults) – Radiation exposure 
limits of:  62.5 mSv whole body and 0.75 Sv thyroid 
dose to off-site public and evacuating workers 
(excluding personnel considered directly at the 
location of the accident). Reactor fuel source term 
limit:  No large releases of uranium or fission 
products to the reactor primary coolant system will 
occur.
x Condition 4 (Extremely Unlikely faults) – Radiation 
exposure limits of:  0.25 Sv whole body and 3.00 Sv 
thyroid dose to off-site public and evacuating 
workers (excluding personnel considered directly at 
the location of the accident). Reactor fuel source 
term limit:  The reactor primary coolant pressure 
boundary must be maintained (unless this failure is 
the initiator) and the reactor confinement must not 
be damaged. 
The predominant risk associated with the ATR is the 
radiological source term contained within the reactor 
fuel.  The ATR safety basis includes a comprehensive set 
of accident analyses that include different reactor fuel-
related releases.  Since most individual experiments 
include relatively small radiological source terms relative 
to that represented by the ATR core, it is often possible 
to demonstrate compliance to the Plant Protection 
Criteria by making simple fissionable material mass 
comparisons between the two. 
II.B. Safety Assurance Throughout All Experiment 
Phases
A total safety culture demands safety assurance 
throughout all experiment phases.  The experiment 
irradiation phase generally represents the greatest risk, 
however, other phases must not be overlooked.  
Experiment components often include fissionable 
materials that must be stored and handled during 
experiment fabrication or assembly.  The associated 
fabrication or assembly may take place in a facility or 
location outside the ATR and therefore be subject to a 
different safety envelope.  Criticality safety issues, for 
example, need to be addressed during assembly as well 
as storage of experiments containing fissionable 
materials.  Post-irradiation conditions can also present 
unique safety issues that must be addressed.  Adequate 
post-irradiation cooling of experiments is a typical matter 
to consider, both for experiment storage and experiment 
shipping.  In a general sense, experience has proved the 
necessity of a procedural requirement for “cradle-to-
grave” safety assurance of all phases of an experiment, 
both prior to and following the actual experiment 
irradiation.
Experiment sponsors and project personnel change 
from experiment to experiment and experiment designs 
may be developed by engineers not routinely associated 
with the ATR.  In addition to potential lack of detailed 
knowledge of the ATR and its accident scenarios, 
experiment project personnel are typically predisposed to 
thought processes in “success space,” rather than “failure 
space.”  For these reasons, experience has shown that it 
is important to involve ATR safety analysis personnel 
throughout all phases of new experiment design 
development.  Safety analysts, predisposed to thought 
processes in “failure space,” can sometimes provide 
insights to help guide experiment designs such that last 
minute surprises are precluded or minimized when the 
experiment safety analyses are actually conducted and 
documented in the applicable ESAP. 
Safety assurance for the irradiation phase in the 
ATR requires not just the assessments documented in the 
individual experiment ESAPs, but also on another safety 
document that is prepared for every reactor operating 
cycle.  This document is identified as the Core Safety 
Assurance Package (CSAP) and it is developed to assure 
safe performance of the reactor given every installed 
experiment, the specific reactor fuel loading, the 
projected reactor cycle power divisions, and the 
projected cycle length.  The CSAP demonstrates, among 
other things, that the reactor control devices will meet 
specified reactivity requirements, that the nominal excess 
reactivity is acceptable, and that the fuel will perform 
within specified limitations.  The CSAP recognizes the 
reactor sensitivity to the PWL type of experiments and 
establishes corresponding reactor power split limitations 
to assure safe operation throughout the projected cycle.  
In general, the CSAP addresses reactor safety given the 
total effects of all installed experiments, whereas the 
ESAPs address experiments individually.  The 
combination of the CSAP and all applicable ESAPs 
assures safe operation of the reactor and the experiments 
being irradiated during each reactor cycle. 
II.C. Experiment Safety Assurance Package 
Requirements
A management control procedure is used to provide 
guidance for the preparation and approval of each ESAP.  
This control procedure requires the ESAP to include the 
“cradle-to-grave” concept of addressing all phases of an 
experiment and it specifies the minimum requirements 
for the outline of the ESAP.  Descriptions of the 
minimum outline subjects, with some additional 
information, are as follows: 
II.C.1 Scope 
The “Scope” section of an ESAP is to provide a 
brief discussion of the purpose of the ESAP along with 
the scope of activities encompassed by the ESAP.  The 
facilities to be involved are to be noted, along with the 
activities to be performed within the facilities.  Pre-
irradiation and post-irradiation activities may involve 
facilities other than the ATR and a “cradle-to-grave” 
experiment assessment needs to address all the 
associated activities.  Due to scheduling challenges there 
are occasions when the scope of an ESAP must be 
initially limited to initial phases of an experiment 
program, e.g., limited to just the receipt of an 
experiment.  The scope can then be revised when 
additional assessments and analyses are developed to 
support additional steps in the experiment program. 
II.C.2 Hazard Classification 
When an experiment is inside the ATR facility (not 
necessarily in the reactor vessel) the hazards associated 
with the experiment are generally enveloped by the 
reactor hazard.  During experiment activities outside the 
reactor facility, however, the reactor hazard and 
associated controls do not apply and experiment hazards 
need to be recognized.  Prior to irradiation, many 
experiments do not represent hazards other than routine 
industrial hazards.  Some experiments, on the other hand, 
may include fissionable or other radioactive material,  
may require machining of pyrophoric materials such as 
zircaloy, may contain liquid metals that react with air, or 
may include other features requiring appropriate hazard 
controls prior to irradiation.  Following irradiation, many 
experiments naturally represent significant radiological 
hazards that need to be identified and controlled.  ESAP 
hazard classifications of experiment activities serve to 
assure that hazards are identified and appropriately 
controlled. 
II.C.3 Process Description 
Each ESAP is required to include a flowchart as part 
of the experiment process description.  A flowchart is an 
important tool that helps to assure that all experiment 
process steps are recognized and assessed for accident 
conditions.  It also helps to provide order in an ESAP 
and facilitates definition of process boundaries and 
applicable safety envelopes.  The safety envelope during 
irradiation of an experiment is different, for example, 
than the safety envelope during movements of the 
irradiated experiment outside of the ATR. 
A written description of each experiment process 
step is expected to include information pertaining to the 
physical location, applicable facility, materials involved, 
and equipment to be used.  Also to be included are 
applicable procedures, individual tasks, pertinent facility 
and experiment parameters and any associated alarm or 
mitigating action setpoints, special personnel 
requirements, and any associated hazards with the step 
being addressed. 
The ESAP process description is to include the 
governing safety envelope for each identified process 
step.  Different process steps frequently have different 
safety envelopes and it is important to recognize the 
differences.  A safety envelope typically consists of the 
applicable facility controlling safety documentation.  The 
safety envelope for irradiating an experiment consists of 
the ATR Safety Analysis Report and Technical Safety 
Requirements, whereas the safety envelope for shipment 
of the irradiated experiment may consist of the 
applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) and 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety 
documentation for the chosen shipping container (e.g., 
could be a Type A container versus a Type B). 
II.C.4 Demonstration of Compliance 
The fourth section of the ESAP is to demonstrate 
that an experiment complies with the applicable safety 
envelope requirements.  This demonstration of 
compliance is typically expected to consist of tables of 
applicable requirements with associated statements that 
demonstrate how each requirement is satisfied.   
Although this part of the ESAP is not actually safety 
analysis, it does assure that applicable safety analysis 
commitments and technical safety requirements are not 
overlooked.  For experiments processed in the ATR, the 
aforementioned management control procedure lists the 
minimum set of commitments and requirements that 
must be included in the “Demonstration of Compliance” 
section of the ESAP.  Discussions of several types of 
these commitments and requirements are presented as 
follows.
Detailed fissionable material constraints are imposed 
as technical safety requirement administrative controls to 
assure nuclear criticality safety during fueled experiment 
handling and storage.  Criteria are defined to establish 
when an experiment is in approved fuel storage and 
specific limitations are imposed for experiment handling 
when the experiment is outside of approved fuel storage.  
Demonstration of compliance for fueled experiment 
handling will typically include citations of the specific 
written procedures that implement the requirements.  
Nuclear criticality safety associated with fueled 
experiments in the ATR core is assessed as part of the 
CSAP that accounts for all fissionable material during 
insertions and removals from the core. 
One aspect of accounting for potential impacts of an 
experiment on the reactor safety is assessment of the 
potential effects on the axial neutron flux profile that 
occurs in the ATR fuel during reactor operation.  The 
ATR safety basis is built around a given axial neutron 
flux profile that changes as the fuel depletes.  To assure 
that the reactor remains within its analyzed safety basis, 
it is necessary that no experiment be allowed to cause 
any significant change to the axial neutron flux profile.  
Demonstration of compliance to this requirement often 
requires a physical measurement of the axial neutron flux 
profile with a given experiment, or representative 
mockup of the experiment, installed in the Advanced 
Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility.  The ATRC is a 
replica of the ATR that can be used to verify certain 
nuclear parameters of an experiment before it is installed 
in the ATR. 
The reliability of experiment containment 
boundaries is an important safety issue.  Experiment 
containment that experiences an internal pressure of 
greater than 1.62 MPa or that contains material that can 
generate pressure pulses greater than 2.96 MPa must 
have a design that meets the intent of the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and 
Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, Section III, Class 1 
standards (prototype testing or other approved means 
may also be used to demonstrate the experiment 
boundary will not fail during service conditions).  It is 
not uncommon for experiments to experience internal 
pressures well below these threshold values.  
Consequently, the associated containment boundaries are 
often not designed in accordance with ASME B&PV 
Code, Section III requirements.  In such cases, however, 
it becomes necessary to demonstrate in the safety 
analysis section of the applicable ESAP that the 
consequences of containment failure will be acceptable 
when the probability of failure is considered as 
anticipated.
The Demonstration of Compliance section of an 
ESAP also includes a number of constraints related to 
experiment materials.  These material constraints are 
directed toward assuring safety of the experiment and the 
reactor, both during normal operation and during 
accident conditions, especially accidents in which the 
experiment containment boundary fails and internal 
materials become exposed to the reactor primary coolant 
water.
For fueled experiments, it is necessary to assure that 
the experiment will not melt when forced coolant flow is 
terminated and during experiment handling.  It is 
therefore necessary to determine the associated minimum 
time for which coolant flow must be maintained 
following reactor shutdown.  In some cases no continued 
forced coolant flow may be required and in some cases 
an extended decay time beyond flow termination may be 
needed to assure that an accidentally dropped experiment 
will not melt.  The demonstration of compliance to this 
requirement will often be documented by specifying in 
the ESAP the required minimum time that the given 
experiment must remain in its irradiation position in the 
reactor before it is allowed to be moved to the adjoining 
water-filled storage canal.   
Post-irradiation handling of experiments at some 
point includes handling of shipping containers, some of 
which can cause significant damage if dropped.  
Therefore, a number of requirements pertaining to cask 
lifts are part of the Demonstration of Compliance section 
of each ESAP. 
PWL experiments include in-pile tubes that are 
subjected to demanding conditions.  The combination of 
radiation damage, relatively high pressures, and elevated 
operating temperatures gradually leads to degradation of 
in-pile tube materials.  Therefore, fast neutron fluence 
and creep strain limits, for example, are required.  
Demonstration of compliance is documented for these 
requirements prior to each reactor operating cycle. 
A comprehensive set of enveloping analyses for safe 
operation of PWL experiments is included as part of the 
ATR safety basis.  Demonstration of compliance 
requirements also include comparisons of proposed PWL 
operations with the enveloping analyses to assure that 
each PWL experiment is operated within the safety basis 
for each reactor cycle.  One comparison includes, for 
example, the potential reactivity insertion due to voiding 
in a PWL in-pile tube.  
Experiments frequently involve the use of gases 
inside the experiment containments.  Therefore, the 
potential for gas leakage into the reactor vessel exists.  A 
specific Demonstration of Compliance requirement 
assures that potential gas leakage into the reactor is 
assessed and shown to meet the aforementioned Plant 
Protection Criteria.  Gas passing through the reactor core 
in unexpected locations can result in different 
consequences depending on the volume of gas and the 
location.  Gas passing through the ATR fuel elements 
can, for example, cause a heat transfer crisis, whereas 
gas passing through a flux trap region can cause a 
positive reactivity insertion. 
Capsule experiments rely on reactor primary coolant 
water for their heat rejection.  Although PWL 
experiments do not rely on cooling by reactor primary 
coolant, the outer surfaces of the PWL in-pile tubes are 
in contact with reactor primary coolant.  One of the most 
fundamental requirements for capsule experiments (and 
the PWL in-pile tube surfaces in contact with the reactor 
primary coolant) pertains to the assurance that no flow 
instability will occur during a flow decrease caused by a 
loss of all operating primary coolant pumps during 
reactor operation.  This type of accident is anticipated to 
occur as a result of a loss of off-site power (ATR primary 
coolant pump motors utilize commercial electrical 
power).  A loss of primary coolant pumps results in an 
immediate reactor shutdown and a decrease in reactor 
primary coolant flow.  As the primary coolant pumps 
coast down, the emergency pumps maintain primary 
coolant flow, but at a significantly reduced flow rate.  
Two different types of heat transfer crises could 
potentially occur during this transient and therefore the 
requirement is divided into two parts.  The first part of 
the requirement is that the departure from nucleate 
boiling (DNB) ratio is always greater than two (or that 
the heat flux at the hottest spot is lower, by at least three 
standard deviations, than the DNB heat flux computed 
for the condition) during the flow transient.  The second 
part of the requirement is that the rise in bulk reactor 
primary coolant temperature along the experiment (or 
PWL surface in contact with reactor primary coolant) hot 
track is less than half the value that would cause flow 
instability (or the highest reactor primary coolant 
temperature is lower, by at least three standard 
deviations, than the value that would cause the flow to 
become unstable) during the flow transient.  A very 
conservative approach to this analysis is achieved by 
assuming either the maximum rated power for the reactor 
at the beginning of the transient or by assuming an initial 
reactor power that is significantly above the maximum 
operating power level that will be allowed during 
irradiation of the experiment.   
The “Demonstration of Compliance” section of each 
ESAP complements the actual safety analysis to assure 
that a minimum list of applicable experiment safety 
issues are consistently addressed from experiment to 
experiment. 
II.C.5 Safety Analysis 
The actual safety analysis for each ATR experiment 
is to be documented in a safety analysis section of each 
ESAP.  The safety analysis is to address at least the most 
limiting postulated event for each of four probability 
levels and is to demonstrate that the ATR Plant 
Protection Criteria (see previous abbreviated 
descriptions) will be satisfied throughout all ATR steps 
of the experiment process.  Experiment steps not taking 
place within the boundaries of the ATR facility may, of 
course, have different applicable acceptance criteria for 
consequences of postulated accidents. 
The comprehensive set of PWL experiment accident 
analyses documented in the ATR safety basis typically 
makes it possible for the safety analysis section of each 
individual PWL experiment ESAP to easily demonstrate 
that the experiment falls within the existing safety 
envelope. 
The radiological source terms associated with 
capsule experiment accidents are typically small in 
comparison with the different source terms associated 
with the ATR safety basis assessments regarding 
accidents involving the ATR fuel.  Therefore, fueled 
capsule experiment accidents are often compared to ATR 
fuel accidents by merely comparing fissionable material 
masses. 
The safety analysis for each capsule experiment is 
tailored to the experiment.  Typically the safety analysis 
is expected to address a variety of reactor abnormal 
operating conditions including, for example, such items 
as reactor overpower and overpressure (110% and 
120%).  The accident conditions for capsule experiments 
are varied but almost always involve some human error 
related events. 
II.C.6  Unreviewed Safety Questions 
Each ESAP is required to include a section that 
addresses the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) issue.  
Typically this section states the conclusion regarding the 
issue and references the specific USQ evaluation (or 
screening) that supports the conclusion. 
II.C.7  ESAP Conclusions 
Each ESAP is required to include a recommendation 
as to whether the experiment, as presented in its process 
steps, should be conducted.  The recommendation is 
basically a conclusion regarding the acceptability of the 
risk for conducting the experiment. 
II.D.  Experiment Safety Assurance Package 
Development 
ATR experiment engineering or experiment project 
personnel are usually responsible for development of 
designated ESAPs.  Early involvement of nuclear 
engineering personnel familiar with the ATR safety basis 
and experiment safety issues is usually encouraged.  
Experience has shown that involvement of ATR 
experiment engineering and safety analyst personnel 
early in the development of experiment designs 
contributes to successful development of ESAPs and 
conduct of experiments.   
Development of all the supporting analyses for 
conducting a given experiment is usually an iterative 
process.  There are some analyses, however, that must be 
finalized  before other analyses can be completed.  
Successful ESAP development hinges around 
recognition of the critical analysis sequences that are 
required.  One typical analysis sequence that occurs is as 
follows.  The detailed experiment design forms the basis 
for performing the neutron and gamma heating analysis 
during reactor operation.  The results of this analysis 
become inputs for thermal-hydraulic analyses of the 
experiment.  The results of the thermal-hydraulic 
analyses then feed into stress analyses that are needed to 
demonstrate adequate experiment containment.  Thermal 
and reactivity analyses can be tied together, for example, 
in cases involving experiments located in the reactor flux 
trap regions. 
Successful ESAP development and conduct of an 
experiment can also hinge on determining early in 
experiment development whether or not physical 
measurements will be required in the ATRC facility.  
These nuclear measurements can be long lead time items. 
The level of conservatism used in analyses 
supporting experiment safety assurance packages may 
vary depending on the nature of the experiments.  Some 
experiments are clearly more simple and benign than 
others and may warrant less conservatism in the 
associated analyses.  In some cases, such as the coast 
down of primary coolant flow described in Section 
II.C.4, the level of conservatism is prescriptive. 
II.E. Experiment Safety Assurance Review 
 and Approval
ESAPs are typically authored by engineers familiar 
with the experiments being addressed.  The authors are 
frequently involved in the development and/or analyses 
of the experiments. 
A peer review of each ESAP is typically performed 
by an engineer in the ATR experiments engineering 
organization.  In addition to the required peer review, a 
review is required by the ATR nuclear safety engineering 
organization.  This review is typically performed by an 
experienced engineer familiar with the ATR safety basis 
and experiments conducted in the ATR.  Each ESAP 
must also be given line management approval by the 
ATR experiments organization. 
Final approval of each ESAP is based on review by 
an independent safety review committee composed of 
members with a variety of technical backgrounds and 
nuclear experience.  This committee has a high level of 
authority and broad review coverage relative to the 
operation of the ATR.  Approval by this committee is 
required before any experiment can be irradiated.  
III. CONCLUSIONS 
Experience has shown that application of the safety 
assurance methodology described in this paper has 
supported the safe operation of a wide variety of 
experiments in the Advanced Test Reactor over a period 
of many years. 
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